MATH4321 游戏开发理论算法

MATH4321 Game Theory (2023 Spring)Assignment 1Submission deadline of Assignment 1: 11:59p.m. of 10th Mar, 2022 (Fri)Instruction: Please complete all required problems. Full details (including (i)description of methods used and explanation, (ii) key formula and theorem usedand (iii) calculation and final answer) must be shown clearly to receive full credits.Please make sure that your work is clearly presented. Marks can be deducted forincomplete solution or unclear solution. You may earn extra score by completingsome bonus problems. Also, additional score will be given for well-writtenassignment.

1. Game Theory

Please submit your completed work via the submission system in canvas before thedeadline. Late assignment will not be accepted.Your submission mustbe 100% hand-written (typed assignment will not be accepted, you may writeon ipad if you wish) in a single pdf. file (other file formats will not be accepted) and contain your full name and student ID on the first page of theassignment.Problem 1 (Required, 25 marks)In a two-person games, each player can choose to submit one ofthefollowingrequestssimultaneously without anycommunication: Request 1: Give me $1,000 Request 2: Give other player $4,000.We assume that the payoff function of a player is the total amount received by theplayer after the games. Also, we assume that both players adopt pure strategy.(a) Express the games in the normal form.(b) Determine if there is any dominated strategy in this games. Determine the finaloutcomes of the games.(c) Verify that the final outcome obtained in (b) is the Nash equilibrium.Problem 2 (Required, 25 marks)The payoff matrix of a two-person games is given as follows:Player 2W X Y ZPlayer 1 A (8,7) (6,6) (4,8) (2,8)B (5,4) (10,9) (5,5)(3,6)C (6,9) (5,4) (9,10) (7,3)D (5,8) (4,7) (5,6) (6,4)Assume that both players adopt pure strategy.(a) Reduce the games using IESDS.(b) Hence, find all possible Nash equilibrium of the games.(c) Hence, find the Pareto-optimal equilibrium and the risk-dominant equilibrium.Problem 3 (Required, 25 marks)An employee (player 1) who works for a boss (player 2) can either work (W) or shirk (S),while his boss can either monitor the employee (M) or ignore him (I). As in manyemployee-boss relationships, if the employee is working then the boss prefers not tomonitor, but if the boss is not monitoring then the employee prefers to shirk. The gamecan be represented by the following payoff matrix:Player 2Monitor (M) Ignore (I)Player 1 Work (W) (1,1) (1,3)Shirk (S) (0,2) (3,1)Find all possible Nash equilibria (Pure strategy and Mixed strategy) of this games. Pleaseprovide full justification to your answer.Problem 4 (Required, 25 marks)(a) We consider a -person games. Suppose that for any combinationofopponents’strategies , the pure strategy ∈ is the unique best response forplayer . Show that any strategy other than is the dominated strategy forplayer .
(b) Recall that ∈ is dominated by some mixed strategy ∈ Δ if and only if.Then we say is dominated strategy for player .(i) As discussed in the lecture, it is sufficient to check the above inequalityholds for any rival’s pure strategy . Show that if is dominatedstrategy, then we must havefor any rival’s mixed strategy ?.(ii) Suppose that a pure strategy is dominated by a mixed strategy with() > 0, show that is also dominated by another mixed strategy′with′() = 0.(iii) If ∈ is dominated by some mixed strategy , show that playernever choose under any mixed strategy Nash equilibriumBonus Problem 1 (Optional, 25 marks)We consider a contribution games as follows: people in a company are working in abusiness project. You are given that Each person can choose either contribute (denoted by ) or not contribute(denoted by ) in the project. The cost of contributing the project is > 0. The project will be successful if at least people (where ≤ ) contributed tothe project. If the project is successful, each member will get a payoff of + > 0, where, arepositive constant and denotes the number of people contributing theproject. If the project is notsuccessful, each member will get nothing.Assuming that the players adopted pure strategy,(a) If + < , show that nobody will contribute under the Nash equilibrium.(b) If + > , we let 0 be the smallest integer which + 0 > . Determineall possible Nash equilibrium for this game.(Hint: Since all players are symmetric (i.e. having same payoff and same payofffunction), so you can describe the Nash equilibrium by specifying the number ofpeople who will contribute to the project. On the other hand, you will need todivide the analysis into several cases depending on the value of . Try to recallmy comments about the contributed games presented in the lecture.)Bonus Problem 2 (Optional, 20 marks)We consider the Cournot Duopoly games as discussed in Example 8. In this problem, weshall explore the mathematical justification of the result obtained in the lecture note.For = 1,2,3, …, we let = [, ] denotes the strategic set of firm after roundof IESDS. Recall that 0 = [0, ∞) and 1 = [22.5, 45] after the 1st round of IESDS (i.e.adjusting both upper bound and lower bound of the strategic set).(a) Show that.(b) Using mathematical induction, show that22.5 ≤ ≤ ≤ 45.(c) Show that≤ +1 +1 ≤ .(d) Hence, show that the sequences {} and {} converge and find their limits.Based on this result, deduce the survivor(s) under IESDS.
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